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Navigational accidents in wintertime conditions occur relatively frequently, yet there is little systematic
knowledge available about the circumstances under which these occur. This paper presents an analysis of
navigational shipping accidents in the Northern Baltic Sea area which occurred in the period 2007–2013.
The analysis is based on an integration of various data sources, aiming to reconstruct the accident con-
ditions based on the best available data sources. Apart from basic accident information from the original
accident databases, data from the Automatic Identification System is used to obtain insight in the oper-
ation type during which the accident occurred, as well as into other dynamic aspects of the accident sce-
nario. Finally, atmospheric and sea ice data is used to reconstruct the navigational conditions under
which the accidents occurred. The analysis aims to provide qualitative insights in patterns and outlier
cases in the accidental conditions. Correspondingly, visual data mining is selected as analysis approach,
because of its utility in obtaining qualitative knowledge from data sources through a combination of visu-
alization techniques and human interaction with the data. Special attention is given to the strength of
evidence of the identified accident patterns. The results are primarily useful for improving risk analyses
focusing on oil spill risks in winter conditions and for developing realistic training scenarios for oil spill
response operations.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Maritime transportation is an important activity in the North-
ern Baltic Sea, with maritime trade of vital economic importance
for several countries in the area. Harsh winter conditions result
in sea environments with complex and dynamic ice. Together with
winter darkness reigning over these northern areas, these condi-tions present specific operational risks for ships navigating in these
conditions (Riska et al., 2007).
The ice cover depends on the severity of the winter, but typi-
cally extends southwards from the Bay of Bothnia from around
mid-November and from the eastern Gulf of Finland westwards
from around mid-December. In harsh winters, significant parts of
the Baltic Proper can become ice-covered as well. Ice conditions
usually remain until mid-April in the Gulf of Finland and early
May in the Bay of Bothnia (Jalonen et al., 2005). During the ice sea-
son, ships navigating these areas are subjected to specific restric-
tions and regulation through the Finnish-Swedish winter
navigation system (FSWNS). This system consists of various mech-
anisms to ensure the safety of shipping by placing constraints to
the ships trading in these areas. The FSWNS consists of five main
components: ice class regulations, additional requirements, ice
services, traffic restrictions and icebreaker assistance. These
amongst other ensure that ships are adequately ice-strengthened,
have sufficient propulsion power, are adequately loaded, receive
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sponding to the technical characteristics and receive timely and
appropriate assistance by icebreakers (TraFi, 2010). For a concise
description of these components, see Valdez Banda et al. (2015,
2016).
Understanding maritime accidents is an important aspect of
improving maritime safety, and several authors have presented
analyses to increase this understanding, e.g. Samuelides et al.
(2008), Kum and Sahin (2015), Yip et al. (2015), Eliopoulou et al.
(2016) and J. Zhang et al. (2016). Despite the importance of winter-
time maritime transportation in the Baltic Sea, very little research
has been dedicated to improving the understanding of wintertime
accidents or their related risks in this area. Jalonen et al. (2005)
presented a preliminary risk analysis of winter traffic, including a
short description of selected number of winter accidents. Valdez
Banda et al. (2016) performed a risk analysis of winter navigation
in Finnish waters based on limited accident data and expert judg-
ments. Their main finding is that while navigational accidents in
ice typically lead to less serious consequences, especially ship col-
lisions and groundings can lead to very serious consequences, par-
ticularly in relation to marine environmental pollution (Valdez
Banda et al., 2016). The presence of the ice cover is an important
reason for this, as it can be very challenging to retrieve oil spilled
as a result from navigational accidents, as evidenced by the
Runner-4 accident in the Gulf of Finland in 2006 (Wang et al.,
2008). Therefore, a more elaborate risk management model, focus-
ing on the probability of different oil spill sizes in collision acci-
dents and the feasibility of different actions to reduce these risks
is presented by Valdez Banda et al. (2015, 2016). Notwithstanding
the above work, the understanding of wintertime accidents in the
Baltic Sea area is very limited, both concerning the processes
resulting in accident occurrence as well as the conditions under
which these occur.
Therefore, this paper presents an analysis of wintertime naviga-
tional accidents. Given their comparatively high risks due to their
potential for accidental large-scale oil spills, focus is on collisions
and groundings. In particular, it is investigated under which condi-
tions these accidents occur in Northern Baltic winter conditions.
Such knowledge is useful for reducing uncertainty in risk analyses
focusing on oil spill risks in winter conditions (Valdez Banda et al.,
2016) and related response preparedness assessments (IMO, 2010),
for increasing understanding and planning focused risk manage-
ment actions (Valdez Banda et al., 2015), and for developing realis-
tic and relevant training scenarios for oil spill response operations.
The knowledge obtained on impact conditions in ship-ship colli-
sions in ice conditions is useful for maritime waterway risk analy-
sis, as also for open water conditions the related uncertainties are
significant (Goerlandt et al., 2012).
The research questions addressed in this paper are as follows.
What are the prevailing sea ice and meteorological conditions dur-
ing the accidents? In which winter operation type has the accident
occurred? For ship-ship collision accidents: what are the impact
scenarios, i.e. under which angles, at what speeds and at which
impact locations does the striking vessel impact the struck vessel?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the data sources used in the analysis are introduced and in Sec-
tion 3, the analysis methods are described. Section 4 presents the
results, while a discussion is made in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.2. Data sources
In this section, the data sources used in the presented analysis
are briefly described. The basic data source used is the North
BAceD database, an integrated maritime accident database forthe Baltic Sea area. As this database only contains consistent infor-
mation about a limited number of basic characteristics of the acci-
dents, additional data sources were added to this database to
enable a reconstruction of the accident scenario based on the best
available sources. In light of the research questions stated in the
introduction, especially data from which the operation type and
impact conditions can be obtained, and the prevailing environmen-
tal conditions, were needed. The utilized basic data sources are
briefly introduced next. These were further processed into the
database which is used for further analysis, as described in
Section 3.
2.1. Maritime accident databases
Various challenges in using maritime accident databases have
been reported. First, databases are known to suffer from various
levels of underreporting, so that obtaining a ‘‘complete” image of
the accidents in a given area cannot be achieved (Grabowski
et al., 2009). Lützen (2002) addressed this issue in the context of
accidents leading to water ingress. Second, different databases do
not contain the same information and moreover apply different
taxonomies of similar information types (Ladan and Hänninen,
2012). Third, several databases have changed their taxonomy over
time, further complicating a consistent analysis over aggregated
periods. Finally, databases suffer from missing and incorrect data,
leading to gaps in the analysis and potentially to misleading
results.
In order to obtain an as complete as possible picture of the acci-
dents which occurred in the Northern Baltic Sea, the North BAceD
database available from the Finnish Transportation Safety Agency
is used. This is an integration of four maritime accident databases
covering different geographical areas, all including the Baltic Sea.
These concern the Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit database, the
HELCOM database, the DAMA database and the EMCIP database.
Details about these, including a description of the included data
fields, are provided by Ladan and Hänninen (2012). The method
for integrating these is described by Mazaheri (2015).
The North BAceD database contains only very generic informa-
tion about the accidents, so that e.g. detailed analyses of the pro-
gression of the accident over time, the systemic factors involved
in the accident development or the crew actions and related
human or organizational ‘‘errors” are not possible based on the
available data. For knowledge acquisition about such factors, more
in-depth analyses of specific accident investigation reports is
needed. Hence, analysis of such factors is beyond the current scope.
Furthermore, while the accident databases distinguish different
accident types, such as collision, grounding and sinking, none of
the databases contain information about the winter navigation
operation type during which the accident occurred. This informa-
tion, however, is important for maritime risk analysis and manage-
ment, because the oil spill risks associated with the different
operation types differ significantly (Valdez Banda et al., 2016).
The operation types can be identified using dynamic visualization
of maritime traffic data, see e.g. Goerlandt et al. (2016). Details
about the applied methodology to determine these are given in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
Finally, the database does not contain consistent information
about the environmental conditions. For instance, the EMCIP data-
base does not contain this information, whereas in databases
where the information fields are provided, different taxonomies
and missing data made the recorded data very difficult to process
in a meaningful way. For instance, the DAMA database applies
standardized categories for wind direction, speed and sea state,
but contains no information about sea ice conditions. The HELCOM
database only distinguishes ‘‘ice-free” and ‘‘sea ice present” condi-
tions. Having no other specific fields for environmental conditions,
Table 1
AIS data fields applied in the present analysis.
Data field Unit Explanation
MMSI number [–] A 9-digit code uniquely identifying a vessel
Time stamp [s] Time at which the message is recorded, format: yyyy-
mm-dd hh:mm:ss
Position [–] Longitude and latitude of transmitted message, in
WGS-84 coordinate system
Ship type [–] A 2-digit code identifying the type of vessel, see USCG
(2012)
Ship length
and width
[m] Dimensions from bow to stern and side to side, see
USCG (2012)
Ship speed [kn] Speed over ground
Ship course [] Course over ground, relative to true north. This is the
direction in which the ship is moving.
Ship heading [] Direction in which the bow of the ship is pointing,
relative to true north
1 HIRLAM is a hydrostatic numerical weather prediction model (Undén et al., 2002)
sed in several configurations for operational weather forecasting at the Swedish
eteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI).
2 AROME is a small scale numerical prediction model, developed by Meteo-France
eity et al., 2010).
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account of the sea state and visibility, often attributing these con-
ditions as ‘‘causes” of the accident. However, the lack of uniformity
of these free text fields render the descriptions given more or less
useless in the context of the research questions stated in the intro-
duction. For these reasons, it was decided to couple the accident
cases with data from sea ice and weather data repositories, allow-
ing uniform treatment of these environmental conditions.
2.2. Traffic data: the Automatic Identification System (AIS)
The 2002 IMO SOLAS Convention, Chapter V Regulation 19,
mandates that most vessels over 300 GT on international voyages
are to be equipped with a Class A type AIS transceiver. The data
transmitted by this Automatic Identification System is known as
AIS data. As an information exchange platform between vessels
and shore organizations, AIS contains, amongst other, time-
dependent data about the location, speed, course and navigational
status of vessels.
The original purpose of AIS was collision avoidance but many
other applications have since developed and proposed in the scien-
tific literature. These include: ship surveillance, tracking and secu-
rity (Ou and Zhu, 2008), collision avoidance and decision support
(Mou et al., 2010), discovery of traffic patterns (Xiao et al., 2015),
traffic simulation (Van Dorp and Merrick, 2011), ship routing
development (Chen et al., 2015), near miss detection (W. Zhang
et al., 2016), risk analysis (Qu et al., 2011), emission estimation
(Jalkanen et al., 2014), ecological impact analysis (Merchant
et al., 2012), and maritime spatial planning (Shelmerdine, 2015).
For the present study, full-rate AIS data from the period
01.11.2007 to 01.05.2013 was used, with data fields as shown in
Table 1. The data was made available by the Finnish Meteorological
Institute, based on an agreement with the Finnish Transport
Agency regulating of access to historic AIS data for scientific
research purposes. The data processing and visualization methods
are presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
2.3. Data related to sea ice and atmospheric conditions
The data for contextualising the accident cases in terms of sea
ice and atmospheric conditions was obtained from different
sources. Sea ice data was obtained from the High Resolution Oper-
ational Model for the Baltic (HIROMB) and the daily sea charts pub-
lished by the Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI). Cloud cover
and wind conditions were taken from the Mesoscale Analysis Sys-
tem (MESAN), whereas visibility, precipitation and temperature
were obtained from the PMP system. These data sources are briefly
introduced below.
HIROMB (High Resolution Operational Model for the Baltic) is
the operational ocean forecast model of the Swedish Meteorologi-
cal and Hydrological Institute (SMHI) (Funkquist and Kleine, 2007;
Wilhelmsson, 2002). It is a three dimensional baroclinic ocean
model coupled with a Hibler-type sea ice model. It is used in sev-
eral setups, those used in present paper is a 1 nautical mile resolu-
tion setup covering the Baltic Sea with boundary in Kattegat and
two 3 nautical mile resolution setups with boundary in Skagerak
and North Sea respectively. The model is run two times daily. Data
assimilation of salinity, temperature and various ice parameters
from in-situ measurements and satellite observations are done at
the start of each run.
The gridded ice charts published by the Finnish Meteorological
Institute (FMI) consist of data related to ice concentration and
thickness, and ice type, and are used primarily for issuing ice
reports as part of the Finnish-Swedish Winter Navigation System
(TraFi, 2010). The charts are drawn daily by ice experts, making
use of all available ice information (satellite images, icebreakermessages, observations), see Eriksson (2009). Charts are stored
daily with a resolution of 1 nm.
MESAN (Mesoscale Analysis System) is a system for mesoscale
analysis of selected meteorological variables (Häggmark et al.,
2000). The analysis is performed with optimal interpolation of
observations on a background field from the operational numerical
weather forecast model HIRLAM (High Resolution Limited Area
Model). The resolution is 0.1 (11 km) on a rotated latitude longi-
tude grid covering all of Scandinavia. The parameters in MESAN
are typically those that are not directly available from other
numerical weather prediction models or only available as diagnos-
tic variables, e.g. wind at 10 m above sea level.
PMP (‘ProduktMonteringsParameter’) is a system at SMHI
where the forecast meteorologist for each parameter selects a fore-
cast from several models with possibility to edit the field. The
result is the official forecast from SMHI. The input models vary
over time and generally consists of the best local models and con-
figurations (HIRLAM1, AROME2) and forecasts from European Centre
for Medium Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF). The resolution is
0.1 (11 km) on a rotated latitude longitude grid with hourly output.
From the forecast products above, only data from the reference
time immediately before the accident time were used.2.4. Other data sources
Where the original North BAceD database had missing parame-
ters related to the vessel, use was made of two vessel information
databases. IMO numbers (a unique identification number), ship
type and vessel size were obtained from the Global Integrated
Shipping Information System (GISIS) (IMO, 2016). MMSI numbers,
needed to identify vessels in the AIS database as described in Sec-
tion 2.2, were obtained from an online vessel tracking service pro-
vider (VesselFinder, 2016).
For categorizing the sea area where the accident occurred, use
was made of the position as recorded in the North BAceD database
and/or as obtained from the videos made from AIS data as
described in Section 3.2 and 3.3. This position was compared with
sea charts, from which the accident position was classified either
as port area, archipelagic waterway or open sea.
Finally, for determining the light conditions, which relates to
the sun position relative to the horizon, use was made of the posi-
tion and time of the accident. The location was obtained from the
North BAceD database and/or the videos made from the AIS data,u
M
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Fig. 1. Overall analysis process of wintertime navigational accidents.
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in the accident database and is determined using the AIS videos.
These parameters were used as input for calculating the sun posi-
tion relative to the local horizon using a method described in the
Astronomical Almanac by Seidelmann (1992). The light conditions
were classified as daylight, twilight3 and night.3. Analysis methods
The overall process of constructing the integrated database and
analysing the wintertime navigational accidents is shown in Fig. 1.
The five steps, as well as the integrated database ‘‘North BAceD+”
are described below.
3.1. Step 1: filtering and cleaning data
The original North BAceD accident database consists of data
from four different databases, as outlined in Section 2.1. Of the
records in these databases, only those occurring during winter
months in the period November 2007 to May 2013 in the Northern
Baltic Sea area are retained. The time period was selected because
of the limitations of the AIS data, which was available only from
this period. Winter months are defined here as November to
May, because during these months, there may be ice present in
the study area (Riska et al., 2007). The Northern Baltic Sea is
defined here as the sea areas composed of the Gulf of Bothnia
and the Gulf of Finland, as defined by HELCOM response, see
Fig. 2. These areas were selected because they are totally ice-
covered during normal winter conditions and because maritime
accidents leading to large oil spills in these areas would require
sub-regional cooperation in oil spill response between the relevant
contracting parties of the Helsinki Convention (HELCOM, 2015).
Thus, other potentially ice-covered areas in the Baltic Sea are out-
side the current scope. Within the study area, all accidents are con-
sidered, irrespective of whether or not there was ice present at the
accident location at the accident time. Thus, the analysis concerns
accidents during the winter season, rather than accidents in ice
conditions.
Further filtering was performed based on the accident type. As
the focus is on high-risk accidents from the viewpoint of large-
scale accidental oil pollution, only collisions (including both ship-
ship collisions and collisions with objects) and groundings were
retained for further analysis, based on a previous risk analysis indi-ig. 2. Northern Baltic Sea area: Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Bothnia, (HELCOM,
015).
3 In this paper, twilight includes both civil and nautical twilight. Civil twiligh
occurs when the sun is less than 6 below the horizon, nautical twilight when the sun
is less than 12 below the horizon.tcating that only these accident types have the potential for large-
scale pollution (Valdez Banda et al., 2016).
Subsequently, the data was cleaned and missing values updated
in the database. Based on the IMO number in the North BAceD
database and information in other vessel databases, MMSI num-
bers and data related to ship type and main ship dimensions were
added. This was done for about 30% of the cases. Cases with miss-
ing IMO numbers and missing coordinates, leaving no information
to link accident conditions to AIS data, were not retained in the fur-
ther analysis.3.2. Step 2: constructing videos
The construction of the videos of the accident cases required the
AIS data to be processed. A distinction was made between twoF
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 Type-I video: ship identity (IMO and MMSI number) is known
for the accident case. The video shows the vessels’ contours,
speed vectors and dynamic data. This video type dynamically
tracks the vessel involved in the accident, as outlined below
for the example case in Video 1.
 Type-II video: ship identity (IMO and MMSI number) are
unknown for the accident case, but the accident location is
known. The video dynamically tracks the vessels in the vicinity
of this location, showing the vessels’ contours, speed vectors
and IMO numbers.
The steps to construct the videos are shown in the flowchart of
Fig. 3, and are briefly outlined below.
Step i. All AIS data is grouped by ship (using the MMSI number)
and chronologically sorted. This results in trajectories of each
vessel over the considered time period. Trajectories are con-
structed for the entire calendar day on which, according to
the North BAceD database, an accident occurred.
Step ii. The AIS data is resampled per ship to obtain the posi-
tion, speed and course at equal time instances, using a 10 s time
interval. This step is necessary because the transmission rate of
AIS messages depends on the navigational status, the speed and
rate of turn of the vessel, see USCG (2012). However, to deter-
mine the impact conditions in collision accidents, simultaneous
positions of the vessels are needed.
Step iiia. If the identity (MMSI number) of the vessel(s)
involved in the accident is unknown, the AIS data of the vessels
in the vicinity of the given accident location is collected for each
time step. An inspection domain with adjustable size is used,
with default value of 2NM.
Step iiib. Using the data from Step iiia., a Type-II video is cre-
ated and the vessel(s) involved in the accident is/are identified.
Step iv. When the identity (MMSI number) of the vessel(s)
involved in the accident is known, the AIS data of the vessels
in the vicinity of the given vessel is collected for each time step.
An inspection domain with adjustable size is used, with default
value of 2NM.
Step v. Using the data from Step iv., a Type-I video is made for
all accident cases. This video type is used for all analyses of the
winter navigation operation type and, if applicable, the impact
conditions.
Video 1 shows a Type-I visualization of the AIS data of a selected
accident case, where following elements are shown.
A. Dynamic data. The time and location of the accident case
indicates when and where it occurs. This is important informationFig. 3. Sequence for constructing accto link the accident with values for atmospheric and sea-ice condi-
tions, as time and location are needed to search through the data-
bases described in Section 2.3.
B. Vessels involved in the accident. Central in a 2 NM inspec-
tion domain delineated by concentric circles as shown in Video 1,
the ships involved in the accident are shown by a contour at their
instantaneous positions. A speed vector gives an indication of the
projected positions of the vessels in a time window of 1 min, to
facilitate identification of their dynamics.
C. Vessel data. Data of the vessel(s) involved in the accident is
shown. Static data include the MMSI number, ship type and size
(tonnage and main dimensions). Dynamic data includes the speed,
course over ground and heading of the vessel(s), which are impor-
tant parameters to describe the impact conditions.
Video 1 shows a bow-stern collision between two cargo vessels
in a convoy in the Bothnian Bay. A third vessel ahead of the two
vessels involved in the accident is seen to slow down around
06:00, upon which the centrally shown gradually slows down
and comes to a near stand-still around 06:04. The following vessel
also slows down but cannot avert a collision, which occurs at
06:05.
3.3. Step 3: analysing videos
For cases where the accident location is known, but the IMO
number was missing, Type-II video was created and inspected. If
an accident was apparent in the video, e.g. when two vessels come
in contact, the IMO numbers were recorded and Type-I videos
made, which were used for further analysis.
For each accident, the video was inspected and several param-
eters were recorded which are relevant in describing the accidental
situation. First, the exact time of the accident was determined, as
in the North BAceD database, for most accidents, only the date
was provided. Second, the exact position of the accident was deter-
mined, as for many cases, the coordinates provided in the North
BAceD database proved to be erroneous (often significantly). The
authors can only speculate as for the reasons for these errors: they
may occur e.g. due to poor recording standards, lack of procedures
for quality assurance of data entries, or simply through typograph-
ical errors. Third, the winter navigation operation type is deter-
mined, distinguishing six categories based on Rosenblad (2007):
independent navigation, towing, escorting, convoy, double convoy
and cutting loose. One additional category (drifting) was identified
based on the videos of the accident cases. These are defined in
Table 2, indicating which characteristic patterns were looked for
to determine the operation type from the videos. The authors have
gained experience in identifying the operation types from the visu-
alizations, based on earlier work where similar visualizations were
applied, see Goerlandt et al. (2016). Fourth, for ship-ship collisionident videos based on AIS data.
Table 2
Winter navigation operations: definition and characteristics, Rosenblad (2007).
Operation Definition (D.) and characteristics (C.)
Independent
navigation
D. The vessel navigates through the water or ice fields without icebreaker assistance
C. The video shows no icebreaker in the vicinity of the vessel
Towing D. The assisted vessel is towed by an icebreaker as it cannot follow the icebreaker in an escort or convoy operation because of high ice pressure or
because the channel has too much slush ice
C. The vessel appears closely behind the icebreaker, with same speed and course. Towing is preceded and followed by a period when the vessels
are stationary for connecting/disconnecting the tow
Escort D. The assisted vessel follows an icebreaker at a close distance, in a channel broken by the icebreaker
C. The icebreaker navigates with one vessel (disregarding a possibly towed vessel) following the trajectory of the icebreaker in close distance
Convoy D. Two or more assisted vessels follow an icebreaker at close distance, in a channel broken by the icebreaker
C. The icebreaker navigates with two or more vessels (disregarding a possibly towed vessel) following the trajectory of the icebreaker in close
distance
Double convoy D. Two or more assisted vessels follow two icebreakers at a close distance, in a wide channel broken by the two icebreakers
C. Two icebreakers, the second ahead or behind but slightly abeam the first, assist a vessel which typically has a significantly larger width than
the icebreakers
Cutting loose D. A vessel which has become beset in ice, e.g. due to compressive ice, is assisted by an icebreaker which breaks the nearby ice, releasing the ice
pressure
C. The assisted vessel is stationary and the icebreaker moves back and forth and/or around the vessel in close proximity, often accompanied with
compressive ice conditions
Drifting D. A vessel is moving, not due to its own propulsion system but due drifting currents or sea ice
C. A vessel moves at a low speed, where course and heading are not necessarily aligned
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recorded. These are the speed of the vessel(s) at impact and for
ship-ship collision accidents, the location of impact and the impact
angle, as defined in Section 3.4.
3.4. Step 4: integrating data
The information obtained from the video analysis was incorpo-
rated in the accident database. Furthermore, for each accident, the
weather and sea ice data was extracted from the databases
described in Section 2.3, based on the accident coordinates and
time. The sea area classification was determined using sea charts
as outlined in Section 2.4. The light conditions, i.e. whether there
was daylight, night or twilight, are determined based on the acci-
dent coordinates and time, using an algorithm described by
Seidelmann (1992). The integrated database applied for further
analysis is referred to as North BAceD+. The data fields in this data-
base are summarized in Table 3, where it is noted that the opera-
tion types ‘towing’ and ‘double convoy’ of Table 2 are not retained
as no such accidents were identified in the database. No draught
information was available in the data sources.
3.5. Step 5: analysing data
After constructing the integrated database described in
Section 3.4, it was analysed. Due to the relative infrequent occur-
rence of navigational accidents in the area and several uncertain-
ties relating to the accuracy of the original North BAceD dataset
(see Section 2.1), the dataset was relatively small. In total, there
were 45 accident cases with each 32 data attributes as shown in
Table 3. In cases where more accident data is available, it may be
feasible to construct mathematical models to obtain insights, e.g.
by learning Bayesian Networks (Hänninen and Kujala, 2014; J.
Zhang et al., 2016) or by developing regression models (Yip, 2008).
In case of smaller datasets, a more feasible approach is to use
visual data mining techniques to explore patterns and outlier
cases. Visual data mining takes benefit of the high capacity of
human visual perception. Humans are visual thinkers and effi-
ciently identify patterns, trends, anomalies and outliers in what
is seen. As such, visual representations extend and amplify our cog-
nitive capacity, and support understanding, reasoning and decision
making (Card et al., 1999; Keim et al., 2008). During the data min-
ing process, data visualization assists in forming hypotheses aswell as answering specific questions about possible patterns in
the data. Large amounts of data can be presented compactly in a
visual form, and even smaller data sets can reveal interesting fea-
tures. Such techniques have been used in earlier work concerning
maritime accidents, e.g. for investigating the relation between
weather conditions and fishing vessel incidents (Wu et al., 2009)
and for obtaining insights in recreational boating accident patterns
(Sonninen and Goerlandt, 2015).
Different visualization techniques, implemented in software
packages to enable user interaction with the data, combined with
human cognition and insight in the nature of phenomenon
described in the dataset, are used to reveal different aspects of
the data. Conventional statistical graphics, such as bar chart, box
plot and scatter plot, can be used for analysing distributions of
individual variables or pair-wise correlations. However, multivari-
able data needs more advanced techniques that can reveal more
complex patterns and relationships. These techniques, such as
the parallel coordinate plot (PCP), are interactive, their effective-
ness depending on the actions of and interpretations made by
the user.
The parallel coordinate plot (Inselberg, 1997, 1985) organizes
axes of multiple variables in parallel and thus enables access to a
large number of variables concurrently. Each data object is pre-
sented as a multiline crossing the axes according to its values for
the corresponding variables. PCP is a useful method for identifying
relationships between groups of similar data objects across a range
of variables. However, as the pattern depend on the order of axes,
reordering them is an essential part of interaction and the knowl-
edge construction process. In a static presentation, such as this
paper, only snapshots of what a PCP analysis reveals can be pre-
sented. To more clearly distinguish certain features of interest in
the data, different colors can be applied to data subsets. In the cur-
rent analysis, use is made of the Orange software package (Demsar
et al., 2013). For a description of how a PCP diagram is constructed,
its mathematical basis and guidance on its interpretation, the
reader is referred to Inselberg (2009).4. Results
4.1. Patterns relating to sea ice conditions
Fig. 4 depicts a parallel coordinate plot (PCP) showing the pat-
terns in the relations between operation types, sea area, sea ice
Table 3
Summary of data in the constructed North BAceD + database.
Data field Unit Source Categories/Additional notes
General accident characteristics
Date [–] NDB Format: dd.mm.yyyy
Time [–] AIS-V Format: hh:mm:ss
Location [–] NDB, AIS-V WGS-84 coordinates
Sea area [–] AIS-V, SC {Port area,Archipelagic waterway,Open sea}
Accident type [–] NDB, AIS-V {Stranding/grounding/bottom contact,Collision with an object,Collision with other vessel}a
Operation type [–] AIS-V {Independent navigation,Escort,Convoy,Cut loose,Drifting}
Vessel characteristics (in case of collision with other vessel: struck ship)
Name [–] NDB
IMO number [–] NDB, VDB
MMSI number [–] VDB, AIS-V
Ship type [–] VDB, AIS-V {Work vessel,Tanker,Bulk carrier,Cargo vessel,RoPax, Icebreaker}
Gross Tonnage [–] VDB
Deadweight [tonnes] VDB
Length [m] VDB, AIS-V
Breadth [m] VDB, AIS-V
Vessel characteristics (only in case of collision with other vessel: striking ship)
Name [–] NDB
IMO number [–] NDB, VDB
MMSI number [–] VDB, AIS-V
Ship type [–] VDB, AIS-V {Work vessel,Tanker,Bulk carrier,Cargo vessel,RoPax, Icebreaker}
Gross Tonnage [–] VDB
Deadweight [tonnes] VDB
Length [m] VDB, AIS-V
Breadth [m] VDB, AIS-V
Sea ice conditions
Ice type [–] IC {No ice,Level ice,Slightly ridged ice,Ridged ice,Heavily ridged ice}
Ice concentration [%] HIROMB Fraction of area covered with sea ice relative to total area
Level ice thickness [m] HIROMB Thickness derived from total mass of ice per unit area
Ice ridge density [km1] HIROMB Number of ridges per unit distance
Ridge height [m] HIROMB Average height of pressure ridge in the area (sail and keel)
Snow depth [m] HIROMB Thickness of the snow layer
Atmospheric conditions
Light conditions [–] AA {Daylight,Twilight,Night}
Visibility [nm] PMP
Cloud cover [%] MESAN
Wind speed [m/s] MESAN
Wind gust [m/s] MESAN
Wind direction [–] MESAN {N,NNE,NE,ENE,E,ESE,SE,SSE,S,SSW,SW,WSW,W,WNW,NW,NNW}
Precipitation type [–] PMP {No precipitation,Drizzle,Rain,Snow and rain,Snow}
Precipitation amount [g/m2 h] PMP
Temperature [C] PMP
Impact conditions
Impact speed vessel 1 [kn] AIS-V In case of ship-ship collision: struck vessel
Impact speed vessel 2 [kn] AIS-V Only in case of ship-ship collision: striking vessel
Impact angle [] AIS-V Angle between centre lines, measured from struck vessel’s stern
Impact location [–] AIS-V Location on the struck vessel hull: {Bow, Side, Stern}
Notes: AA = method for calculating sunrise time from Astronomical Almanac, AIS-V = video based on AIS data, HIROMB = High Resolution Operational Model for the Baltic,
IC = ice charts, MESAN = Mesoscale Analysis System, NDB = North BAceD + database, PMP = ‘ProduktMonteringsParameter’ system, SC = sea charts, VDB = Vessel character-
istics databases.
a Throughout this paper, the category ‘grounding/stranding/bottom contact’ is simply referred to as grounding, for reasons of brevity.
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dents are found to occur in the ‘double convoy’ and ‘towing’ oper-
ation types, defined in Table 2. It is seen that groundings and
collisions with an object occur during independent navigation,
whereas ship-ship collisions occur in all operation types but pri-
marily in escort, convoy and cut loose operations.
Groundings occur in port areas and archipelagic waterways,
typically in ice-free conditions or with thin ice in low concentra-
tion. Ship-ship collisions show a very different pattern, occurring
in all sea areas but primarily in open sea and archipelagic water-
ways. Similar patterns are found for escort, convoy and cut loose
operations. Accidents occur only in ice conditions with high ice
concentration and ice thicknesses upwards of 20 cm. Ridging con-
ditions vary significantly, but slight ridging with ridge densities of
1 ridge per km and ridge heights of about 1.5 m are predominant.
Snow depths below 0.5 m are typical, but also here large variations
occur.One collision with an object occurred in ice free conditions in
the open sea area, but this accident type is more commonly asso-
ciated with port areas under typically rather moderate ice condi-
tions. Most commonly, level ice conditions are found, which in
port areas means there is fast ice, i.e. fastened to the coastline or
to the sea floor.
4.2. Patterns relating to atmospheric conditions
Fig. 5 depicts a PCP showing the patterns in the relations
between operation types, sea area, and various atmospheric condi-
tions relating to precipitation, visibility and temperature. The plot
shows that visibility conditions and light conditions show similar
patterns for all accident types. Visibility conditions range from
moderate to excellent, with very good and excellent visibility most
frequent. More accidents occur during daylight conditions (21
cases) than during night (16 cases), which is somewhat surprising
Fig. 4. Winter navigation accidents in relation to sea ice conditions.
Fig. 5. Winter navigation accidents in relation to atmospheric conditions: precipitation, visibility and temperature.
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Fig. 6. Winter navigation accidents in relation to atmospheric conditions: wind.
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winter months, days are short at the latitudes where the Northern
Baltic Sea is located. Comparatively many accidents occur during
twilight conditions (8 cases) as well.
There is a large variation in the cloud cover under which the
accidents occur, for all accident types. Nevertheless, it is apparent
that the sky is typically almost completely covered with clouds.
There is however a notably different pattern in the prevailing tem-
peratures. For ship-ship collisions, temperatures range from ca.
20 C to 5 C, and most typically are around 5 C. However,
groundings occur at temperatures ranging from ca. 10 C to
10 C, with most typical values of ca. 5 C. This is in line with the
finding from Section 4.1 that groundings typically occur in ice-
free conditions, whereas ship-ship collisions occur in sea ice
conditions.
During all accident types, there typically is no precipitation (35
cases), with snow (7 cases) being the most frequently occurring
precipitation type. Other types (drizzle, rain and snow and rain)
occur only in one accident case each. If there is precipitation, the
amount of snow typically is between 50 and 200 g/m2 h. The one
outlier case where a ship-ship collision occurred under heavy rain
(670 g/m2 h) was in a port area in night time under visibility con-
ditions classified as ‘good’.
Fig. 6 depicts a PCP showing the patterns in the relations
between operation types, sea area, and various atmospheric condi-
tions relating to the wind conditions. The plot shows that there is
no strong pattern for the relations between wind speed and wind
gust and the different accident types. For groundings and ship-
ship collisions, wind speeds range from 2 m/s (light breeze) to
13 m/s (strong breeze), with a median of ca. 5 m/s, i.e. a gentle
breeze.4 The only significant difference is found for collisions with
an object. These occur in port areas, which probably due to more4 For an interpretation of the wind speeds: see MetOffice (2010).sheltered conditions lead to lower wind speeds, with a median of
ca. 4 m/s. The most typical prevailing wind directions during all acci-
dent types are north-western, northern, north-eastern and eastern.
There is a quite stable relationship between wind speed and wind
gust, in that higher wind speeds also lead to higher wind gusts.
One of the useful characteristics of visual data mining is the
ability to ‘brush’ data, i.e. to interact with the dataset through intu-
itively selecting certain subsets of the data, which may reveal
interesting features in the data. An example of an interesting find-
ing resulting from brushing the data in the PCP focusing on winter
accidents in relation to atmospheric conditions is given in Fig. 7.
The same data features as in Fig. 5 are shown. In the upper PCP,
only accident cases in cut loose operations are shown, whereas
in the lower PCP only accident cases in escort and convoy opera-
tions are selected. Using this technique, it is seen that the patterns
between these operation types are practically identical for cloud
cover, precipitation amount and types, temperature and visibility
conditions. However, whereas escort and convoy collisions primar-
ily occur during night and twilight conditions, collisions in cut
loose operations appear to occur more frequently in daylight.4.3. Ship-ship collisions: impact conditions and vessel characteristics
Figs. 8 and 9 depicts a PCP showing the patterns in the relations
between impact conditions, sea area and operation types, for ship-
ship collision accident cases. Escort and convoy operations show
largely similar patterns. The stern is typically the location where
the struck vessel is impacted, and impact angles are close to 0,
indicating that the vessels are heading in the same direction. The
impacted vessel typically has stopped or is proceeding at low
speed, up to ca. 4 kn. The impacting vessel has a somewhat higher
speed, up to ca. 7 kn. These characteristics are not surprising given
the normal conditions under which these operations occur, as evi-
dent from the description in Table 2. Comparing the impact speeds
Fig. 7. Winter navigation accidents in relation to atmospheric conditions: brushing data from cut loose (top) and escort and convoy operations (bottom).
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which are 10 kn and 9 kn based on an analysis by Goerlandt et al.
(2016), it is found that these are significantly lower.
Ship collisions in cut loose operations show a different pattern.
The impact location is most commonly the struck ship’s bow or
stern, but impacts on the ship side occur more frequently as well,
whereas impact angles are typically oblique (stern-bow or bow-
bow). The struck vessel always is stationary, whereas the striking
vessel has a speed between ca. 1 kn and 7 kn.
The PCP of Fig. 9 also shows two outlier cases concerning a col-
lision occurring in independent navigation and a collision between
drifting vessels. The former is a collision in a port area, with thetwo vessels impacting at the struck vessel’s side under an oblique
angle at low impact speeds. The latter occurred in the open sea,
with the vessels impacting each other’s sides at very low speed
with close to parallel headings.
Figs. 10 and 11 show PCPs clarifying the patterns between the
sea areas, operation types and the characteristics of the vessels
involved in ship-ship collision accidents. For escort operations,
the struck vessel always is the assisting icebreaker, with striking
vessel types tankers, bulk carriers or general cargo vessels. The
striking vessels are typically rather small, with a deadweight of
ca. 5000 tonnes and a length around 100 m. Accidents in escort
operations typically occur in archipelagic waterways.
Fig. 8. Winter navigation ship-ship collision accidents in relation to impact conditions: convoy and escort operations.
Fig. 9. Winter navigation ship-ship collision accidents in relation to impact conditions: cut loose, drifting and independent navigation.
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similar to escorts. However, whereas escort accidents mainly occur
in archipelagic waters, convoy collisions are more common in open
sea areas. The struck vessel type here is typically a cargo vessel of
ca. 5000 tonnes with a length of around 100 m. Striking vessels are
larger than in escort operations, with a typical deadweight of
10,000 tonnes and a length of 140 m. Variations nonetheless arerelatively large. In one accident was a tanker of 23,000 tonnes
deadweight and 180 m struck by a large bulk carrier.
Cut loose operations show a different pattern. Here, the striking
vessel is always the icebreaker assisting the beset vessel, and acci-
dents occur both in open sea and archipelagic waterways. The ice-
breakers operating in the Northern Baltic Sea have a deadweight
between 1400 and 6500 tonnes and a length around 110 m. Struck
Fig. 10. Winter navigation ship-ship collision accidents in relation to vessel characteristics: convoy and escort operations.
Fig. 11. Winter navigation ship-ship collision accidents in relation to vessel characteristics: cut loose, drifting and independent navigation.
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a deadweight between 4000 and 8000 tonnes and a length
between 90 and 120 m. Two accidents involved a work vessels
(pusher tugs) with a deadweight of ca. 450 tonnes and a lengthof ca. 40 m. One accident involved a Panamax tanker with dead-
weight ca. 64,000 tonnes and a length of 238 m.
Ship-ship collisions in independent navigation occur rarely but
the records show only accidents in port areas. In one case, the stuck
Fig. 12. Winter navigation collisions with an object in relation tovessel characteristics and impact conditions.
Fig. 13. Winter navigation groundings in relation to vessel characteristics and impact conditions.
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Fig. 14. Number of accidents per accident type and vessel type, period November 2007 to May 2013.
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length of ca. 110 m, with a cargo vessel of 2500 tonnes deadweight
and a length of 80 m the striking vessel. In another, two harbour
tugs with a deadweight of ca. 50 tonnes and a length of ca. 20 m
collided. The ship-ship collision in a drifting situation occurred in
the open sea area between two RoPax vessels of 3500 deadweight
and 160 m length and 7800 deadweight and 120 m length,
respectively.4.4. Collisions with object: impact conditions and vessel characteristics
Fig. 12 shows a PCP depicting data attributes of collisions with
an object, focusing on the sea area where these occurred, the
impact conditions and vessel types and sizes. It is seen that the
vessels involved typically are cargo vessels, but also a tanker and
a RoPax have been implicated. The impact speeds range from
1 kn to ca. 6.5 kn, and the ship sizes range from ca. 3000 to
6000 tonnes deadweight. Nevertheless, due to the relative infre-
quent occurrence of this accident type (only 7 cases are found),
no strong patterns can be identified.Fig. 15. Number of accidents per sea area,period November 2007 to May 2013.4.5. Grounding/stranding/bottom contact:impact conditions and vessel
characteristics
Fig. 13 shows a PCP depicting data attributes of grounding acci-
dents, focusing on the sea area where these occurred, the impact
conditions and vessel types and sizes. It is seen that groundings
in archipelagic waterways typically involve cargo vessels of a dead-
weight between 800 and 3000 tonnes and a length of around 80 m.
Nevertheless, also larger vessels of over 20,000 tonnes and ca.
170 m length have been involved. Impact speeds in archipelagic
waters range between ca. 4 and 12 kn.
A somewhat different pattern is found for groundings in port
areas. Here, the most frequently implicated ship types are cargo
vessels of a deadweight between 3000 and 5000 tonnes and a
length around 110 m. While impact speeds can be as high as
12 kn, these are mostly lower, often even below 2 kn, i.e. signifi-
cantly lower than in groundings in archipelagic waters. One work
vessel (a dredger), a RoPax and two tankers have grounded in port
areas. Their sizes range between 300 and 8000 tonnes deadweight
and ca. 45–115 m length.Comparing the speeds with the impact speeds in ship-ship col-
lisions as shown in Figs. 8 and 9, it is evident that these are signif-
icantly higher in grounding accidents. This likely relates to the
finding from Fig. 4 that these operations typically occur in ice-
free conditions.4.6. Summary statistics
While the focus of the analysis is the patterns occurring in win-
tertime accidents conditions, it is instrumental to also provide
some insights into the relative occurrence frequency of different
accident types. In Figs. 14–16, some aggregate analyses concerning
the number of accidents in different conditions, are shown. These
quantitative results provide some insights beyond the qualitative
findings from Section 4.5. However, it is stressed that for a proper
interpretation of these quantities, the multidimensionality of the
data must be considered. In particular, the identified patterns,
summarized in Table 6 of Section 5, should be considered alongside
the quantitative relative occurrence frequencies. It is also stressed
that the number of accidents only concerns those cases which were
identified both in the accident database and in the AIS data. Hence,
the numbers should be considered relative to one another, not as
absolutes.
Fig. 16. Number of accidents per operation type,period November 2007 to May
2013.
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type and by ship type. In the case of ship-ship collisions, the ship
type is here that of the struck vessel. It is seen that ship-ship col-
lisions occurred 21 times, groundings 17 times and collisions with
an object 7 times in the considered time period. Cargo vessels were
implicated most frequently in all accident types, whereas icebreak-
ers also often were the struck vessel. Other ship types (work ves-
sels, tankers, bulk carriers and RoPax vessels), were occasionally
involved in an accident.
From Fig. 15, it is seen that 17 accidents occurred in port areas,
and the same number in archipelagic waterways. 11 accidents
occurred in open sea. From Fig. 5, it is seen that most accidents
in the open sea concern ship-ship collisions, whereas groundings
occur in port areas and archipelagic waterways.
From Fig. 16, it is evident that most accidents (26 cases)
occurred during independent navigation. Comparing this to
Fig. 4, it is seen that most of these accidents are groundings. Cut
loose operations led to 8 accident cases, whereas convoy and escort
operations resulted in respectively 4 and 6 accidents. One accident
occurred with the vessels drifting.Table 4
Evidential characteristics and criteria for strength-of-evidence rating for data and
model evidence types, Goerlandt and Reniers (2016).
Evidence type Strong evidential
characteristics
Weak evidential characteristics
Data
Quality Low number of errors High number of errors
High accuracy of
recording
Low accuracy of recording
High reliability of data
source
Low reliability of data source
Amount Much relevant data
available
Little data available
Models
Empirical
validation
Many different
experimental tests
performed
No or little experimental
confirmation available
Existing experimental
tests agree well with
model output
Existing experimental tests
show large discrepancy with
model output
Theoretical
viability
Model expected to lead to
good predictions
Model expected to lead to poor
predictions5. Discussion
The analysis using visual data mining techniques on integrated
data sources has provided novel insights into the conditions under
which wintertime navigational accidents in the Northern Baltic Sea
occur. Jalonen et al. (2005) and Valdez Banda et al. (2015, 2016)
focus on accident frequencies and vessel types involved in winter
accidents in Finnish waters, relying both on accident data and
expert judgments. Valdez Banda et al. (2015, 2016) also analyses
the sea ice conditions to some extent, but do not relate this to
the sea areas or the operation types under which these occur.
The prevailing atmospheric conditions have not earlier been
related to winter navigation accidents. Finally, whereas impact
scenarios have been studied for ship-ship collisions in ice-free con-
ditions, see e.g. Samuelides et al. (2008), Goerlandt et al. (2012)
and Youssef et al. (2013), no similar work for accidents in ice con-
ditions is known.
In scientific work, it is important to consider uncertainties in
data and methods in relation to the conclusions of an inquiry
(Douglas, 2009). As mentioned in the introduction, one significant
use of the presented analysis is maritime transportation risk anal-
ysis. Also in risk analysis, the importance of assessing the uncer-
tainty in the evidence base has been highlighted, see e.g. Flage
et al. (2014), Gardoni and Murphy (2014) and Goerlandt and
Reniers (2016).For the current analysis, this means that it is important to make
an informed judgment about the strength of evidence for the dif-
ferent identified patterns in the conditions under which the winter
navigational accidents occurred. It is noted here that strength of
evidence is an alternative way to communicate uncertainty in
the background knowledge, see e.g. Flage et al. (2014).
The strength of evidence is qualitatively rated using a method
suggested by Goerlandt and Reniers (2016). For data and models,
different quality characteristics are considered and judged, from
which an evidential strength is derived. These are shown in Table 4,
where for conditions between strong and weak evidential charac-
teristics, a ‘medium’ rating is applied.
These qualities are assessed in Table 5 for the data attributes
used in the visual data mining, based on the data sources described
in Section 2. A justification is given for the rating, to substantiate
why a certain rating is given for a given data attribute. Contrary
to the strength-of-evidence assessment method by Goerlandt and
Reniers (2016), who focus on the evidence base for subjective
probability assignments, the amount of data is here taken as a
characteristic of the identified patterns through the use of PCPs,
and is thus assessed separately.
In Table 6, the patterns identified through visual data mining
using PCPs in Section 4 are summarized. Additionally, a rating is
associated with the number of cases supporting the identified pat-
tern, and the strength of evidence (SoE) of the attributes involved
in the pattern, making use of the ratings of Table 5. Based on these
ratings, an overall strength of evidence for the pattern is derived.
This is done following a simple rule shown in Table 7. The rating
for the strength of evidence of the pattern takes the rating of the
strength of the pattern (related to the number of data points the
identified pattern is based on) as a basis. This rating is moved down
depending on the strength of evidence of the relevant attributes.
Similar rating schemes are used in Gardoni and Murphy (2014)
and Goerlandt and Reniers (2016).
The information in Table 6 is particularly useful for risk analysis
purposes: the identified patterns can be used to define accident
scenarios in a risk model, whereas the uncertainties about these
scenarios can be appropriately accounted for through the strength
of evidence assessment. It is noted that Table 6 only lists the main
patterns found in the data. Outlier cases mentioned in Section 4
should be considered to have low strength of evidence.
In addition, it is important to note that the analysis performed
in this paper has focused on identifying patterns between variables
relevant to contextualize wintertime accidents, as obtained from
accident databases. As stated in Section 1, the research questions
Table 5
Strength of evidence of data attributes.
Attribute Source(s) Section Data Model Justification SoE
Q E T
Accident type NDB 2.1, 3.4 M-H – – Cross-checks between different accident databases underlying NDB and AIS-V. Accurate sea
chart used to distinguish collision with object and groundings
H
AIS-V 2.2, 3.3 H
SC 2.4 H – –
Sea area NDB 2.1, 3.4 M – – Accident locations, if erroneous in NDB, are corrected using AIS videos. Sea chart is used to determine the sea area H
AIS-V 2.2, 3.3 H – –
SC 2.4 H – –
Operations type AIS-V 2.2, 3.3 H – – AIS-V provide good insight in the operational features of Table 2 H
Ice type IC 2.3 L-M – – IC has good quality for operational purposes with good spatial resolution (1 nm), but temporal resolution (24 h) is low M
Ice concentration and
thickness, snow
HIROMB 2.3 M-H M-H H Ice concentration and thickness are assimilated from Ice Charts. Validation shows ice concentration is underestimated
in the ice charts
M-H
Ice ridges L-M L-M L-M Ridging is a local phenomenon. Close to the coast the ridging suffers from deficiencies in fast ice parametrisation L-M
Light conditions NDB 2.1, 3.4 M – – The accident location and time is accurately determined based on NDB and AIS-V, whereas AA is accurate and well-
evidenced.
H
AIS-V 2.2, 3.3 H – –
AA 2.4 – H H
Visibility PMP 2.3 – M M The model is lacking aerosols and condensation nucleauses M
Precipitation PMP 2.3 – L-M L-M Precipitation is regularly validated and found to be of good qualityPrecipitation however can be very local, far below
the resolution of the applied models
L-M
Temperature PMP 2.3 – H H Temperature is regularly validated and found to be of good quality H
Wind parameters MESAN 2.3 – H H Wind predictions are regularly validated and found to be of good quality H
Cloud cover MESAN 2.3 – M-H M-H Precipitation, temperature, wind and cloud cover is regularly validated and found to be of good quality.Cloud cover
during night time is more uncertain
M-H
Impact parameters AIS-V 2.2, 3.4 M-H – – AIS-V provide good insight in ship dynamics. AIS data has good accuracy, but data gaps and interpolation may lower
accuracy of data as shown in video
M-H
Vessel data NDB 2.1, 2.4 L-M – – Data in NDB is often erroneous, but cross-checks with AIS-V and VDB lead to accurate data H
AIS-V 2.2, 3.4 H – –
VDB 2.1, 2.4 H – –
Notes: AA = method for calculating sunrise time from Astronomical Almanac, AIS-V = video based on AIS data, E = empirical validation, H = high, HIROMB = High Resolution Operational Model for the Baltic, IC = ice charts, L = low,
M = medium, MESAN = Mesoscale Analysis System, NDB = North BAceD + database, PMP = ‘ProduktMonteringsParameter’ system, Q = quality, SC = sea charts, SoE = strength of evidence, T = theoretical viability, VDB = Vessel
characteristics databases.
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Table 6
Summary of identified patterns and associated strength of evidence.
Identified pattern Fig. Strength of
pattern
Attribute
SoE
Pattern
SoE
Groundings/strandings/bottom contacts typically occur
in independent navigation 4 H H H
in port areas and archipelagic waterways 4 H H H
in ice- and snow-free conditions or in sparse, thin ice 4 H M-H M-H
in temperatures from ca. 10 C to 10 C, mostly around 5 C 5 M-H H M-H
in wind conditions ranging from light breeze to strong breeze 6 M-H H M-H
Groundings in port areas typically
involve cargo vessels with a deadweight between 3000 and 5000 tonnes and a length of around 110 m 13 L-M H L-M
have an impact speed between ca. 1 and 12 kn, often below 5 kn 13 M M-H M
Groundings in archipelagic waterways typically
involve cargo vessels with a deadweight between 800 and 3000 tonnes and a length of around 80 m 13 M H M
have an impact speed between ca. 4 and 12 kn 13 M M-H M
Ship-ship collisions typically occur in
escort, convoy and cut loose operations 4 H H H
open sea and archipelagic waterways 4 H H H
high ice concentrations with ice thicknesses upwards of 20 cm 4 H M-H M-H
ridged ice types with density ca. 1 km1 and height of ca. 1.5 m 4 M-H L-M M
snow depths below 0.5 m 4 M-H M-H M
temperatures ranging from ca. 20 C to 5 C, mostly around 5 C 5 M-H H M-H
wind conditions ranging from light breeze to strong breeze 6 M-H H M-H
Ship-ship collisions in escort and convoy operations typically occur
in night and twilight conditions 7 M H M
with the striking ship’s bow impacting the stern of the struck ship 8 M-H M-H M-H
with the striking and struck vessels on nearly the same heading 8 M-H M-H M-H
with the struck vessel stopped or moving at low speed, up to 4 kn 8 M M-H M
with speed difference between striking and struck ship of ca. 2 kn 8 M M-H M
Ship-ship collisions in escort operations typically occur
in archipelagic waterways 10 M H M
with the struck vessels an icebreaker 10 H H H
with the striking ship a merchant vessel of ca. 5000 tonnes deadweight and ca. 100 m length 10 L-M H L-H
Ship-ship collisions in convoy operations typically occur
in open sea areas 10 M H M
with the struck ship a merchant vessel of ca. 5000 tonnes deadweight and ca. 100 m length 10 L-M H L-M
with the striking ship a merchant vessel of ca. 10,000 tonnes deadweight and ca. 140 m length 10 L-M H L-M
Ship-ship collisions in cut-loose operations typically occur
in night and daylight conditions 7 M H M
in open sea areas and archipelagic waterways 9 M H M
with the struck vessel stopped 9 H M-H H
with the striking vessel sailing at a speed between 1 and 7 kn 9 M M-H M
with the impact location at the struck ship’s bow, side or stern 9 L-M M-H L-M
with the impact angle oblique (bow-bow or bow-stern) 9 L-M M-H L-M
with the striking vessel an icebreaker with a deadweight between 1400 and 6500 tonnes and a length
around 110 m
11 H H H
with the struck vessel a cargo vessel with a deadweight between 4000 and 8000 tonnes and a length
between 90 and 120 m
11 M H M
Collisions with an object typically occur
in independent navigation 4 M-H H M-H
in port areas 4 M-H H M-H
in ice- and snow-free conditions or in sparse, thin ice 4 M-H M-H M-H
in wind conditions ranging from light breeze to moderate breeze 6 M H M
with an impact speed below 6.5 kn 12 M M-H M
with the striking vessel a cargo ship with deadweight between 3000 and 6000 tonnes and a length between 80
and 120 m
12 L-M H L-M
All accident types typically occur in
very good to excellent visibility conditions 5 M-H M M
heavily clouded conditions 5 M-H M-H M-H
conditions without precipitation 5 M-H L-M M
winds from north-west, north, north-east and east 6 M-H H M-H
82 F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science 92 (2017) 66–84focus on contextualizing wintertime accidents, to get insight into
under which conditions these occur. Two caveats are worth stress-
ing in this context.Table 7
Rating scheme for strength of evidence for the identified pattern.
Strength of pattern Attribute strength of evidence
L M H
L L L L
M L L-M M
H M M-H HFirst, while several patterns are quite clearly discernible, the
existence of a pattern should not be confused with probabilistic
statements that under the conditions given by the identified pat-
tern, accidents are more likely to occur. This is because our data
does not allow insights into the prevalence of these contextual
conditions compared to the total set of conditions. For instance,
while it is apparent in Fig. 4 that collisions with another vessel typ-
ically occur in ridged ice with a hight of ca. 1.5 m, it is not possible
to unambiguously state that accidents are more likely under these
conditions than in other conditions. This is because the depen-
dence between which operations occur in which ice conditions,
F. Goerlandt et al. / Safety Science 92 (2017) 66–84 83and the relative prevalence of ridge heights in ridged ice fields, is
unknown. Investigating this would require a deeper understanding
of the traffic patterns relative to the ice conditions, and the relative
prevalence of different ice conditions. Analysis of such statistical
relative probability, rather than the assertion of the existence of
certain patterns, is beyond the scope of this paper. Further research
is required to make more conclusive statements, and for instance
methods for identifying the operation types for all wintertime traf-
fic (i.e. not only accident cases) would need to be developed.
A second caveat is related to the above: correlation does not
imply causation. Establishing that accidents typically occur in cer-
tain conditions, e.g. in ridged ice of a given thickness, does not
mean that those conditions can be considered to have a causal con-
nection to the accident occurrence. Accident causation is a com-
plex issue, see e.g. Qureshi (2007), and the data does not provide
any proof that the contextual conditions did have a causal effect
to the occurrence of the accidents. The identified patterns should
therefore primarily be understood as describing the historic acci-
dent cases. From this, hypotheses may be formulated as to why
accidents occur under the given conditions, but the patterns them-
selves contain no causal explanatory power.6. Conclusions
In this paper, wintertime navigational accidents in the Northern
Baltic Sea in the period 2007–2013 are analysed, focusing on the
sea ice, atmospheric, operational and impact conditions under
which these occur. Various data sources were integrated to obtain
an as complete and accurate as possible picture of the context of
the accidents. Videos of AIS data were made to obtain insights in
the winter navigation operation type and the impact conditions.
Visual data mining, enabling the identification of patterns in
multidimensional datasets through interactive plotting tools, was
applied to analyse the integrated dataset. Several patterns were
identified, related to the sea areas and operation types in which
different accident types occur. New insights were also obtained
in the prevailing sea ice and atmospheric conditions in the differ-
ent accident and operation types, and patterns in impact condi-
tions were identified. Special attention is given to the strength of
evidence, both concerning the strength of the identified patterns
and the strength of evidence for the relevant data attributes. This
is especially relevant as one envisaged use of the current analysis
is for wintertime maritime transportation risk analysis, where
the consideration of uncertainties in the background knowledge
has gained recent attention.Acknowledgements
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